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Abstract— Introduction of market mechanisms in distribution 
systems is currently subject to extensive studies. One of the 
challenges facing Distribution Market Operators (DMOs) is to 
implement a fair and economically efficient pricing mechanism 
that can incentivize consumers to positively contribute to grid 
operations and to improve economic performance of the 
distribution system. This paper studies a penalty-based pricing 
mechanism in distribution markets and further investigates the 
interrelationship between the locational marginal prices (LMPs) 
at transmission and distribution levels. As a result, a closed-form 
relationship between these LMPs is derived. The possibility of 
zeroing out the settlement profit is further investigated under the 
proposed pricing mechanism. 
Index Terms— electricity markets, locational marginal price, 
distribution system operator. 
NOMENCLATURE 
Indices: 
t  Index for hours.  
m Index for proactive customers. 
l Index for lines. 
Parameters: 
μ Penalty factor for the power deviation.  
λT           Transmission locational marginal price (T-LMP). 
λD Distribution locational marginal price (D-LMP). 
H Generation shift factor. 
Variables: 
Cc Customer payments to the DMO. 
Cu DMO payment to the ISO. 
CΔ DMO cost surplus.  
∆PM Power deviation. 
D Adjustable load.  
Df Fixed load.  
F(P,I) Dispatchable unit operation cost. 
π Dual variable for the power balance equation. 
P DER output power. 
PM Power transfer to the microgrid.  
PDM Total assigned power from the main grid. 
PL Line power flow.  
τ–, τ+  Dual variables for line flow limits. 
α,β Dual variables for demand limits. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
ISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS are currently subject to 
widespread attention as part of the agendas outlining the 
utilities of the future [1], seeking to reform, modernize, 
and upgrade the electric power system infrastructure. Factors 
such as economic requirements for higher efficiency, 
compliance with environmental regulations, and need for higher 
reliability and resiliency are among major drivers of these plans 
[2]. Utilization of modern communications and control 
technologies, providing additional services to customers, and 
improving grid monitoring and protection are examples of the 
goals to be investigated and promoted in these initiatives. The 
efficient operation of the distribution system is also among the 
objectives sought in the agendas proposed for the future of 
electric power systems [1]; a future that is deemed to witness 
significant growth in the participation of microgrids, electric 
vehicles and distributed energy resources (DER) in the 
distribution level [3], [4], a new path forward for distribution 
systems who have traditionally been radial and have had 
unidirectional power flowing in their lines. An optimally 
operated distribution system would create incentives for the 
customers to consume electricity taking into account economic 
considerations. Thus, growing trend of responsive and proactive 
consumers in distribution systems can be considered as another 
driving force for reforming the structure and operation of these 
systems [5]. 
Market-based operation of distribution systems is one of the 
initiatives put forth in the power industry aiming for fostering 
competition through creating market mechanisms in distribution 
system [6]–[9]. Optimal scheduling of microgrids [10]–[12], 
demand response [13] and DERs in a market environment has 
been under extensive studies. One of the challenges facing the 
distribution market operation, which is yet to be effectively 
addressed, is pricing of electricity in those systems. A pricing 
mechanism reflecting the operating condition of the grid has 
been discussed in [14] to improve the economic efficiency of 
the distribution system operation. Such a mechanism would 
reflect the actual state of the distribution system as well as 
utility grid economic realities. At the distribution system, it is 
necessary for the selected pricing mechanism to adapt to 
features such as radial network topology, presence of feeders 
and proactive consumers, as well as the connection to the utility 
grid, so as to ensure a fair and economical settlement of the 
system operation costs. The similarities and differences 
between the wholesale and distribution pricing mechanisms are 
highlighted in [15]. It is demonstrated that transmission LMPs 
D 
(T-LMP), line congestions because of high loads, and 
distribution system losses, can all influence distribution LMPs 
(D-LMP). Locational marginal pricing has been used by the 
ISOs to determine the electricity prices at any certain bus within 
the high voltage power system [16]. Increasing penetration of 
proactive customers, including responsive consumers, 
prosumers, and microgrids, in the distribution system makes it 
necessary for a realistic measure reflecting the cost of energy 
delivery at different locations in the distribution system [17]. 
Such a pricing mechanism would provide a viable means to 
assess the economic performance of different customers in the 
system.  
There have been several research works related to locational 
marginal pricing in the price-based scheduled distribution 
systems. Reference [18] has introduced nodal pricing in such a 
distribution system considering the marginal loss, while 
ignoring network congestion. Contribution of DERs to the loss 
reduction in the distribution system is used in [19] to calculate 
the D-LMPs by an iterative approach based on neural networks. 
Demand responsive loads have been considered in [20] when 
calculating D-LMPs using an AC optimal power flow in 
maximizing the social welfare. Distribution pricing has been 
carried out in a hierarchical dispatch model in [21], which 
offers a decentralized approach to perform the dispatch by 
various regional operators. A variety of methods based on 
quadratic programming for calculating loss factors to be used in 
D-LMP calculation is offered in [22]. A distribution system 
market with high penetrations of solar generation is proposed in 
[23], where D-LMPs are calculated as a function of the 
upstream T-LMP and losses. In [24], an iterative model has 
been used to solve the optimal power flow to obtain the D-
LMPs, simultaneously considering distribution and 
transmission systems. A distributed scheme for calculating D-
LMPs based on T-LMPs with participation factors is presented 
in [25], where D-LMPs are used to drive distribution system 
controls. The calculation of the D-LMPs in highly unbalanced 
distribution systems is a challenge addressed in [26], in which a 
method is presented to calculate loss sensitivities in the 
distribution system. An iterative method is presented in [27] to 
calculate stochastic D-LMPs based on point estimate method 
considering greenhouse gas emissions. Optimal power flow 
based on  three-phase Current Injection Method is used in [28] 
to calculate D-LMPs and address the concerns raised by using 
AC and DC OPF. A game-theoretic approach is proposed in 
[29] to clear the distribution electricity market and calculate D-
LMPs. Another important issue to be considered in distribution 
markets is the market settlement, i.e., how to calculate the 
payments of consumers as well as payments to suppliers. In the 
transmission system, the settlement will be net-zero if there is 
no congestion, i.e., the total payment by consumers will be paid 
to suppliers (generation companies). If there is congestion, 
however, additional charges will be imposed to consumers that 
cause congestion (calculated inherently in T-LMP as a 
congestion cost term), thus resulting in a nonzero settlement. 
ISOs, however, are equipped with additional market 
mechanisms, such as Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) and 
Auction Revenue Right (ARR) to allocate the obtained revenue 
among market participants [30]. Such mechanisms do not exist 
in the distribution system, hence highlighting the need to find a 
mechanism to efficiently redistribute this revenue. 
Presence of an entity that centrally administers transactions 
in the distribution system has been considered essential for the 
distribution systems to be able to set up a locational pricing 
mechanism similar to that in transmission system [31]. The 
Distribution Market Operator (DMO) is an entity described in 
[11] and [16] that has the capability to clear the distribution 
market and determine D-LMPs. The clearing and settlement 
procedures for a distribution market operated by the DMO are 
investigated in [32]. Similar concepts have been put forth in the 
literature. The Distribution System Operator (DSO), as 
described in [7], is an entity that in its maximalist extent can 
facilitate a retail market for demand response and DERs. State 
of New York is pursuing a concept called Distribution Service 
Platform Provider (DSPP) that would be responsible for 
enabling active customer participation in the distribution market 
[6]. Furthermore, the Independent Distribution System Operator 
(IDSO) as defined in [9] would be responsible for  promoting 
market mechanisms to integrate DERs.  
This paper first develops an analytical relationship between 
the D-LMPs and the upstream T-LMP with a focus on high 
penetration of proactive customers. These D-LMPs, which can 
be adjusted using a defined penalty factor, are used to zero out 
any settlement revenue made by the DMO and thus accordingly 
address the challenge of mismatch between the revenue made 
from the customers and the payment to the upstream network.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The proposed 
formulation for the distribution system pricing model and the 
net-zero settlement model are presented in Sections II and III, 
respectively. Case studies are presented in Section IV. The 
paper is concluded in Section V. 
II. PRICING MODEL 
The distribution market in this work is considered to be 
composed of proactive customers, each equipped with a certain 
amount of flexible loads and DERs. It is assumed that at each 
bus in the distribution system there is at least one proactive 
customer that submits demand bids to the DMO, hence index m 
is used to denote both buses and customers. The DMO receives 
the bids and submits one aggregated bid to the ISO, which the 
ISO would accordingly use to clear the market and determine 
awards for each market player, including the DMO. Once the 
DMO is notified of the amount of awarded power, it will assign 
this power to distribution customers based on their submitted 
bids and prevailing operational constraints. The operation cost 
of the distribution market is defined as in (1): 
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This objective function minimizes the power purchase from 
the utility grid while maximizing the benefits of loads in the 
distribution system, i.e., it seeks to maximize the social welfare 
at the distribution market.  
A penalty term is added to the objective function to 
minimize the deviation between the power assigned by the ISO 
(i.e., the assigned power) and the power that is to be purchased 
from the utility via clearing the market (i.e., the scheduled 
power). The power deviation is calculated as ∆PtM = PtM - PDtM. 
Fig. 1 depicts a sample demand bid showing fixed load, 
maximum load, and assigned and scheduled powers. The 
objective is subject to the following operational constraints: 
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These constraints represent the distribution system load 
balance (2), customer bids minimum and maximum limits (3)-
(4), and line flow limits based on shift factors (5)-(6). The first 
term in (5)-(6) accounts for the shift factor of distribution 
system power transfer with the upstream network. The objective 
function can be written as a function of only net load values by 
substituting (2) in (1). The proposed model considers a radial 
structure for the distribution network, thus flow of each line can 
be represented as a function of nodal injections. It is further 
assumed that the microgrids are in close proximity, thus active 
losses are small compared to the power transferred through the 
distribution lines and therefore are negligible. The formulation 
of the active/reactive power losses in distribution networks 
encompassing a larger area will be employed in the future 
works. 
Depending on the values of scheduled and assigned powers, 
the sign of the deviation term within the absolute function can 
be determined. If PtM < PDtM, then |∆PtM| would be equal to –
∆PtM. On the other hand, if PtM > PDtM, then |∆PtM| would be 
equal to +∆PtM. The dual variables of constraints (2)-(6) are 
denoted respectively by π, α, β, τ–, and τ+. After updating the 
objective with substituting the |∆PtM|, the Lagrangian function 
for this optimization problem can be written as follows (both 
signs for |∆PtM| are considered): 
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Taking the derivatives of the Lagrangian function, the following 
equations are obtained: 
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Figure 1. Demand bid curve for customer at bus m. Fm(Dm) for any Dmt is the 
area under this curve. 
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By obtaining π from (9) and substituting in (8), the following 
equation among dual variables is obtained: 
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The D-MLPs can be calculated from (10). It is observed that 
the D-LMP is a function of not only upstream T-LMP but also 
distribution line congestions, the power deviation penalty, and 
the demand bids submitted by the participants. As pointed out 
in [15], in case the distribution system is unable to supply its 
loads using the utility grid power purchases, D-LMPs will 
solely be determined by the characteristics of distribution 
system topology and its local consumers.  
III. MARKET SETTLMENET 
Using the derived D-LMPs, the DMO can efficiently 
calculate the cost of power purchase from the ISO as well as the 
payment of its customers. These two costs are shown in (11) 
and (12), respectively.  
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In order to have a net-zero settlement, these two costs should be 
equal (13).  
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Using (10), it can be written as: 
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By equating this equation to zero, μ can be set so that 
settlement mismatch is removed. The sign of μ in (14) would be 
determined by the value of the assigned power to the DMO by 
the ISO. 
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IV. NUMERCIAL STUDIES 
The pricing model is applied to the IEEE 13-bus test system 
(shown in Fig. 2) [33]. The distributed energy resource data, 
utilized by proactive customers to offer a responsive load, are 
borrowed from [32]. It is assumed that customers submit step-
wise demand bids into the distribution market, however here a 
single-step bid is considered. The bid prices reflect the 
incremental generation costs of local DGs. The maximum daily 
fixed and adjustable loads for all proactive customers are shown 
in Table I. Table II shows the transmission LMP, which is the 
marginal electricity price at bus 1 where this distribution system 
is connected to the upstream transmission system. Table III 
presents the amount of awarded power from the ISO to the 
DMO, which is determined through the wholesale market.  
 
Figure 2. IEEE 13-bus standard test system. 
TABLE I  
SPECIFICATION OF FIXED AND ADJUSTABLE LOADS IN TEST SYSTEM 
Bus 2 3 4 5 6 7
Peak load (MW) 0.86 0.69 0.00 0.00 1.28 0.86
Max. adj. load (MW) 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69
Bus 8 9 10 11 12 13
Peak load (MW) 0.00 2.14 1.28 1.71 0.86 0.00
Max. adj. load (MW) 0.00 1.07 0.00 1.21 0.59 0.00  
TABLE II 
HOURLY TRANSMISSION LMP 
Time (h) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Price ($/MWh) 15.03 10.97 13.51 15.36 18.51 21.80 17.30 22.83
Time (h) 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Price ($/MWh) 21.84 27.09 37.06 68.95 65.79 66.57 65.44 79.79
Time (h) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Price ($/MWh) 115.5 110.3 96.05 90.53 77.38 70.95 59.42 56.68  
TABLE III 
ASSIGNED POWER FROM THE ISO 
Time (h) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Power (MW) 3.90 3.81 3.72 3.96 4.20 4.32 4.98 5.34
Time (h) 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Power (MW) 5.70 5.94 6.12 6.24 6.96 7.92 8.10 8.28
Time (h) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Power (MW) 8.52 8.61 8.10 7.98 7.20 6.69 4.74 4.65  
Four cases are studied as follows to show the impact of 
distribution grid congestion in causing a DMO cost surplus, as 
well as the impact of the proposed penalty factor in reducing 
this surplus to zero, i.e., a net-zero settlement.   
Case 1 (no congestion): In this case, it is assumed that the line 
flow limits are large enough so no congestion will occur in the 
distribution grid. The solution of the distribution market 
clearing problem will result in a total customer payment of 
$10,850 and a total DMO payment of $10,850, this the DMO 
surplus will be zero. D-LMPs are calculated as the byproduct of 
the distribution market clearing problem which all determined 
to be equal to the T-LMP. This result is expected as there is no 
congestion in the grid to cause an increase in D-LMP values.  
Case 2 (grid congestion, no penalty): In this case, the given 
capacity of the lines are considered in the market clearing 
problem and the proposed penalty is ignored, i.e., µ=0. The 
results show that customer payment and the DMO payment are 
respectively obtained as $10,759 and $11,126. The difference 
between these two payments, i.e., $367, is the DMO surplus. 
This surplus is occurred due to the additional payment made by 
customers at buses 2, 11 and 12 which are facing higher D-
LMP values than the rest of this system. The higher D-LMP is 
caused by the congestion at lines 2-3, 8-12, and 10-11. The 
DMO has no mechanism to redistribute this surplus to 
customers. If not redistributed, this surplus can potentially 
incentivize the DMO to operate the grid lower than the desired 
performance levels and seek congestion in the distribution to 
maximize the surplus. Thus the redistribution mechanism, as 
proposed in this paper, seems necessary.  
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Figure 3. Customer payment to the DMO for two cases of µ =0 and CΔ =0. 
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Figure 4. Net settlement as a function of deviation penalty. 
Case 3 (grid congestion, net-zero settlement): In this case, the 
value of µ which leads to a net-zero settlement is calculated 
using the proposed model. The penalty is determined as 
µ=$1.31/MWh. Using this penalty, the customer and the DMO 
payments are respectively calculated as $10,759.2 and 
$10,759.2, which are equal and thus ensure a net-zero 
settlement. Fig. 3 shows the payments of all customers, based 
on their location, in two cases: no penalty (µ=0) and net-zero 
settlement (CΔ=0). The graph illustrates that the payment of all 
customers are decreased when considering a net-zero 
settlement, compared to the case with a positive surplus. This is 
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anticipated as the DMO surplus is redistributed among 
customers. The results also show that the payment reduction 
rate is directly proportional to the amount of the customer load.  
Case 4 (sensitivity analysis): The sensitivity of the distribution 
market settlement with respect to the penalty is investigated in 
this case. Fig. 4 depicts the amount of net settlement decreases 
by increasing the penalty. As this figure shows, the DMO cost 
surplus equals to zero for mismatch penalty between at 
$1.31/MWh, while it is positive for smaller penalty values and 
negative for larger penalty values.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The unique structure of the distribution systems and the 
ongoing developments associated with the integration of DERs 
and responsive loads necessitate the development of proper 
pricing mechanisms to facilitate distribution market operation 
and boost distribution market participation. In this paper an 
analytical model was presented for calculating locational 
marginal prices at the distribution system as a function of 
distribution network congestion, individual bids of customers, 
T-LMP, and penalty terms. It was further investigated whether 
the DMO settlement can be zeroed out by having equal 
payments to the upstream network and from the customers. The 
performance of the proposed model was studied using a test 
distribution system.  
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